The Open Skies Treaty Bites The Dust

When is nothing better than something? Certainly not when it comes to health care, personal income, housing and everything that serves our wellbeing. But not for those who believe that arms control is a snare and a delusion. For them, nothing is better than something. 

Donald Trump has now surpassed all of his predecessors combined when it comes to walking away from agreements to reduce nuclear dangers and weapons. His administration’s announcement that it will withdraw from the 1992 Open Skies Treaty marks the third agreement to be deep-sixed on his watch, after the Iran nuclear deal negotiated in the Obama administration and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty negotiated in the Reagan administration. Previously, Trump was tied with George W. Bush, who withdrew from two agreements — one with Russia and another with North Korea. Trump’s record of walking away from the accomplishments of his predecessors has not made American safer. As arms control unravels, nuclear dangers grow and U.S. alliance ties fray.

The Open Skies Treaty was first broached to Moscow in the Eisenhower administration and was summarily rejected by the Kremlin as legalized spying. President George H.W. Bush revived the idea and challenged Mikhail Gorbachev, who championed glasnost or openness, to put his money where his mouth was. Gorbachev accepted the challenge and, low and behold, a treaty allowing cooperative aerial overflights using commercially available, unclassified technology became possible from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It took 10 years for the Open Skies Treaty to enter into force because all of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union as well as former members of Warsaw Pact that needed to be accommodated. 

The Open Skies Treaty was a boon for newly independent states. Under the terms of the Treaty, they could ride share with the United States over the Russian Federation and share the unclassified data collected on the overflights. These overflights provided tangible as well as symbolic benefits. Since entry into force in 2002, the 34 nations that belong to the Treaty have carried out over 1,500 cooperative overflights. Russia is obligated to accept up to 42 overflights per year. 

Washington and Moscow both chafe at these obligations. Vladimir Putin and Trump would like to be free of them, just as they wished to be free of the obligations imposed by the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty signed by Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev in 1987. This Treaty broke the back of the Cold War nuclear arms competition, eliminating three categories of ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. 

The Soviet General Staff never liked the Treaty’s “Zero Option.” The Russian General Staff felt the same way, and it had a sympathetic listener in Putin who agreed that there were targets in Europe and Asia that needed to be covered with ground-launched missiles prohibited by the Treaty. Russia violated the Reagan-Gorbachev Treaty by beginning to flight test a ground-launched cruise missile of prohibited range toward the end of the George W. Bush administration, and then stiffed the Obama administration when it called for remedial steps. 

Putin wanted freedom of action but didn’t want to be the one to declare the Treaty null and void. Trump did this for him in 2019. The same dynamics now seem to be playing out with the Open Skies Treaty. The Treaty’s obligations reflect the post-Cold War status quo, which is anathema to Putin. U.S. ride sharing with Ukraine and Georgia are a particular affront. Putin isn’t complying fully with the Open Skies Treaty, but unlike the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, his violations are marginal and easily circumvented. Lately, he has added a new insult, designating an airfield in Crimea as a refueling spot for U.S. Open Skies aircraft. 

The Trump administration also chafes at U.S. obligations under the Open Skies Treaty, arguing that Russian overflights provide targeting information for cyber warfare. But the United States is entitled to do exactly the same things with the same sensors on overflights as Russia. The difference is that Moscow has new aircraft and updated sensors employing commercially available, unclassified technology, while treaty opponents have dragged their feet on modernizing the U.S. Open Skies aircraft and sensors. Even so, it’s hard to believe that the United States can’t learn with classified technology what Russia might learn from unclassified technology.

It’s immaterial now. Trump has once again done Putin’s bidding by withdrawing from the Open Skies Treaty, weakening U.S. ties with friends and allies, and retreating still more into his America First fortress. Putin wins by exiting the Treaty and shedding crocodile tears or by staying in and overflying Europe while Washington watches from the sidelines.