Why Russia’s Su-57 Stealth Fighter Wouldn’t Be A Good Choice For Iraq

According to the Russian press, Iraq has recently contemplated buying Russia’s fifth-generation Sukhoi Su-57 jet fighter. If true, this choice would most likely prove problematic for that troubled Middle Eastern nation for several reasons. 

Russia’s state-run Sputnik News quoted Imad Al-Zuhairi, which the outlet described as the military inspector for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, in August saying that Iraq is potentially interested in acquiring Su-57s along with other weapons systems. 

Al-Zuhairi made the remarks while at the Army 2020 defense industry forum in Russia.

“I need airplane, I need fighter, Su-57,” Sputnik quoted Al-Zuhairi saying. “We have many helicopters from Russia, Mi-35, Mi-28, Mi-17 … It is main [air] power in Iraq.” 

Iraq did indeed purchase modern attack helicopters from Russia in the early 2010s rather than American AH-64 Apaches. These Russian attack helicopters saw combat during Iraq’s war against the Islamic State group. 

Iraqi Russian-built Su-25 Frogfoot attack planes also carried out the majority of the Iraqi airstrikes during that war, far more than the fleet of F-16s the United States begun delivering to Iraq in 2015. 

If the Sputnik article quoted Al-Zuhairi accurately, and if Al-Zuhairi is indeed officially conveying a potential Iraqi interest in buying Su-57s, then it’s a highly questionable consideration on Baghdad’s part. 

For one, Iraq would have to spend many billions of dollars for the advanced aircraft at a time when its facing great economic difficulty due to the Covid-19 pandemic and the fall in the world price of oil, the export of which its economy heavily depends upon for revenue. 

Also, the Su-57 is still little more than a prototype and will likely remain so for some time. And while Russia did begin serial production of the aircraft in July 2019, it will probably take several more years before it even enters service with the Russian Aerospace Forces in significant numbers. And exports of the aircraft will likely take even longer.

Then there is the issue of maintenance. Iraq spent over $4 billion for a fleet of F-16s in the 2010s. Today, there are conflicting reports concerning the operational status and upkeep of this fleet since American contractors left Iraq in January 2020 during heightened U.S.-Iran tensions. Some of these reports suggest most of the fleet is presently grounded due to a deadly combination of poor maintenance and corruption at Iraq’s Balad Airbase, where most of Iraq’s F-16s are based.

Fielding stealthy Su-57s would be much more difficult for Baghdad than F-16s without constant Russian technical assistance in the form of advisors and technicians, not to mention training Iraqi pilots to fly the highly sophisticated warplane. If the worst reports about its F-16 fleet’s current state are accurate, then acquiring Su-57s could ultimately end up amounting to little more than an enormous multi-billion dollar waste for Iraq that it quite simply cannot afford. 

Why Baghdad would think it needs Su-57s rather than, say, cheaper 4.5 generation Su-35 multirole fighters – which would provide the Iraqi Air Force with a highly capable fighter for carrying out both air-to-air and ground attack roles that would be much easier to maintain – is certainly questionable.

It’s true Baghdad lacks serious air defenses and doesn’t possess any long-range surface-to-air missiles. Its F-16s are only equipped with short-range air-to-air missiles, so its ability to enforce any shutdown of its airspace is substantially limited. This is likely the reason Iraq has intermittently contemplated buying long-range Russian S-400 or S-300 air defense missiles in recent years. 

Buying Su-57s would make Iraq eligible for U.S. economic sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) federal law since such a purchase would constitute a “significant transaction” with Russia’s defense sector. 

The Russian helicopters Iraq bought in the early 2010s were delivered years before CAATSA became law. Iraq did buy a fleet of T-90 tanks later in the decade, but that purchase doesn’t seem to have qualified Iraq for any CAATSA sanctions, at least not yet. Buying hi-tech multi-billion Su-57s or S-400s, however, would undoubtedly make Iraq eligible for sanctions under CAATSA.

U.S. ally Turkey presently faces the prospect of CAATSA sanctions for buying Russian S-400s against the U.S.’ wishes for $2.5 billion as does Egypt for its recent $2 billion order for a fleet of Su-35s. 

Furthermore, Israel would most definitely oppose a Russian sale of such advanced warplanes to Iraq. In August, Israel expressed its opposition to any potential sale of U.S. fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II jets to the United Arab Emirates, which it has just normalized relations with.

Risking incurring sanctions for an aircraft like the Su-35 might make some sense for Iraq if Baghdad has concluded that such Russian military hardware is more suitable, sustainable and cost-effective for its military’s future than American hardware.

However, opting for Su-57s, far from being a cost-effective investment in the future of its air force, would more likely than not prove to be an unjustifiably costly option for Iraq.